Nick+Reed

Nick Reed


 * A.)****Plan of Investigation**

The question of this investigation is **to what extent was Robert Kennedy’s role significant in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962?** In order to assess the significance of Kennedy's role, the investigation evaluates his involvement in each stage of this nuclear standoff. His role has been assessed, by not only his brother, colleagues, and adversaries, but as well as himself, documentaries, and essays. The significance of Kennedy's role is evaluated from the initial days in which President Kennedy is briefed, during the EX-COMM meetings, and through the conclusion of the crisis. Two of the sources used in the investigation, //Thirteen Days// written by Robert F. Kennedy and the essay, "Robert Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis", written by Mark White are further evaluated according to their origins, purposes, values, and limitations.

The investigation will not evaluate the different ideologies of the participating nations, nor any other opinion other than those of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba.


 * B.)****Summary of Evidence**


 * October 16**: National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, told President John F. Kennedy that the CIA had identified Soviet missiles in Cuba. Robert Kennedy was informed very shortly after. As Attorney General, however, Robert Kennedy’s focus was supposed to be on legal issues, the President often involved him in discussions surrounding foreign policy, especially after the Bay of Pigs invasion. Robert Kennedy was surprisingly quiet during the two ExComm meetings on this day. In one meeting, he passed a note to the President reading, “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.” During the meetings on this day Robert Kennedy favored an invasion of Cuba, a popular sentiment throughout the group.[1]


 * October 17**: Robert Kennedy no longer argued for an invasion. He stated in his memoir of the events, //Thirteen Days//, he argued against initiating military action and instead advocated for a blockade.[2]


 * October 18**: Mr. Kennedy raised an interesting point in response to those who wanted an American assault on Cuba. He said, “it's the whole question of, you know, assuming that you do survive all this, the fact that we're not…what kind of a country we are.” During the meeting he agreed with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that the final two courses of action should be military action, or the blockade. Privately, however, he expressed to his brother that he favored the blockade, however. [3]


 * October 19**: On the fourth day, Robert Kennedy began asking his colleagues to attempt to understand the moral implications of a Pearl Harbor-style attack on such a small nation, such as Cuba. He wanted to take action that showed how serious the US was about getting the missiles out of Cuba, while giving the Soviets appropriate time to react. By the end of this day, the general consensus amongst ExComm was for a blockade, or quarantine of Cuba. [4]


 * October 20**: On this day, Robert Kennedy began to favor a different course of action. He wanted to first institute the blockade, and then tell the Russians that the US would destroy the missile bases. According to Kennedy, this was a better plan from a moral standpoint because there would be no surprise attack.[5]


 * October 21**: Robert Kennedy’s position changed once again, now supporting just a blockade. He no longer wanted an air strike if the Russians did not react quickly, instead he suggested that the administration should keep its options open, and wait for the situation to develop.


 * October 22**: President Kennedy went on television and told the American public of the existence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. He also announced that America would respond with a naval blockade of Cuba. The members of ExComm worked on a plan for implementing the blockade, as well as how to deal with the media.[6]


 * October 23**: During this evening, Robert Kennedy had a secret meeting with Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. Dobrynin insisted that there were no missiles in Cuba. To his knowledge, there were not, Khrushchev did not tell him of their existence. When Kennedy asked if the Soviet ships en route to Cuba would respect the US blockade, Dobrynin indicated they would not.[7]


 * October 25**: Robert Kennedy once again appeared to change his opinion on this day. When some were arguing to intensify the blockade, he stated, “it might be better if you…knock out their missile base. That's the first step…. we tell [the Soviets] to get out of that vicinity in 10 minutes, and then we go through and hit the base.” He argued that this strategy would not have to take place for a couple days, but the US could have a confrontation with the Russians at any time with the blockade.[8]


 * October 26**: On this day, Brazil proposed a plan for the denuclearization of Latin America. A provision in the plan stated that all nations territorial integrity would be honored. Thus, they could not be invaded. Robert Kennedy seemed to disagree with this because he was still in support of an anti-Castro rebellion. Khrushchev mailed President Kennedy a long letter suggesting a way to end the crisis. Khrushchev said that the Russians would remove the missiles if JFK promised not to invade Cuba.


 * October 27**: President Kennedy received another letter from Khrushchev, which demanded new terms to end the crisis, including forcing the US to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Robert Kennedy suggested that the President ignore the second letter and respond to his first proposal. The US pledged not to invade if the missiles are removed. Robert Kennedy promised Ambassador Dobrynin that the US missiles would be removed from Turkey and Italy.


 * C.)** **Evaluation of Sources**

White, Mark. "Robert Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Reinterpretation ." //University of North Carolina//. N.p., Sept. 2007. Web. 28 Mar. 2012. .

Dr. Mark White, born in the United Kingdom, has taught history at universities in Britain and North America. He is currently a teacher of History at the University of London (Queen Mary). Among his six books is //Missiles in Cuba// (1997). The purpose of this article was to interpret Robert Kennedy’s exact role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Dr. White went day by day through the crisis and examined what Robert Kennedy said and believed the United States should do. Kennedy is viewed by many as the most peace-advocating person throughout the crisis, there were however, many times that Kennedy said he thought we needed to attack Cuba. The intense pressure of the situation at first made many people very nervous.

Kennedy, Robert F. //Thirteen Days//. N.p.: W. W. Norton, 1969. Print.

Robert Kennedy wrote this book as a memoir of the events of the missile crisis. He was the US Attorney General at the time, and the brother of the President. He attended all of the famed “Ex Comm” meetings. The purpose of this book was to document a pressing time in history. It talked a lot about the deliberation of the Ex Comm group to make a decision. This book gives great insight into the thinking of President Kennedy during the crisis. It describes the perspectives of members of the meetings, and how they came to certain decisions to avoid nuclear holocaust. Robert Kennedy constantly spoke of the moral and philosophical issues of every choice they made. This book offers insight to the American thinking at the time, but not really the Soviet. Although, President Kennedy was considering throughout possible reactions by the Soviet Union, their actual thought process was not given.


 * D.) Analysis**

Robert Kennedy is often credited for being the leader of the pro-peace group during the ExComm meetings. He seemed to boast himself as such in his memoir of the events, //Thirteen Days.// This statement is not entirely fair though, as Kennedy advocated for an attack on Cuba several times during the early stages of the crisis. Even as the crisis was winding down, he suggested the possibility of bombing the missile base in Cuba. [1] This decision would have ended the ability to have a peaceful end to the crisis, and possibly threatened humanity. Robert Kennedy was neither saint-like nor evil, during the crisis, but human; something that should be duly noted in examining the crisis. The emotions that the people in the ExComm meetings felt were probably unlike any ever emoted by a group of people. They were dealing with an incredibly delicate situation, and without proper planning; it could have been much more of a crisis. After about a week of careful consideration, Robert Kennedy came to a personal conclusion that a blockade was the wisest step to take at the time. Also, Robert Kennedy’s idea of disregarding Khrushchev’s second letter was crucial for the crisis. He could tell that Khrushchev wanted an end to the crisis, just as the Americans’ did, so the US just responded to his first, which was a more emotional and personal letter. Kennedy’s dealing with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin was invaluable at tense times of the crisis. Although, it also should be noted that he did not invent the idea to blockade, McNamara did. Also, he still believed late in the crisis we may have to use more force soon.


 * E.) Conclusion**

To give Robert Kennedy sole credit for maintaining peace during the crisis would not be a fair assumption. Kennedy did play a significant role in the crisis, but his opinion on how the United States should act did change often, and was influenced by other ExComm members. Kennedy clearly did play an important role in the crisis, in that, he was one of many highly respected, and intelligent people who were able to thoroughly dissect the whole crisis, and in the end, make a decision on behalf of not only their country, but also the world.

[1] Coleman, David G. "Cuban Missile Crisis." //Dictionary of American History//. Ed. Stanley I. Kutler. 3rd ed. Vol. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003. 474-475. //Gale Power Search//. Web. 20 Jan. 2012.

[1] White, Mark. "Robert Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Reinterpretation ." //University of North Carolina//. N.p., Sept. 2007. Web. 28 Mar. 2012. . [2] Kennedy, Robert F. //Thirteen Days//. N.p.: W. W. Norton, 1969. Print.

[3] White. [4] Ibid

[5] Kennedy.

[6] White. [7] Ibid [8] Kennedy


 * Byrne, Paul J. //The Cuban Missile Crisis//. Minneapolis, Mn: Compass Point Books,**
 * 2006. Print.**


 * Origin**: Paul J. Byrne wrote this book as a short summary of the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis.


 * Purpose**: This book is intended to give people a brief introduction to the timeline and significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It explains Kennedy’s delegation on the issue and how it was handled in the United Nations, which is interesting. I’m interested to learn more about the meetings that EXCOMM participated in.


 * Value:** This book is not all that valuable for me, as it was very much an introduction to the topic, I’m excited to find a more detailed book that also offers some critical analysis instead of just telling facts.


 * Limitations**: The length of the book is a limitation, but I was able to understand the events that took place during the Crisis, and it only took about 30 minutes to read.


 * Coleman, David G. "Cuban Missile Crisis." //Dictionary of American History//. Ed. Stanley I. Kutler. 3rd ed. Vol. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003. 474-475. //Gale Power Search//. Web. 20 Jan. 2012. **

**Origin:** David Coleman is an American author who has written 9 books regarding 20th century American history. He received a PhD from University of Queensland in Australia, and is currently a history professor at University of Virginia.

**Purpose:** The purpose of this encyclopedia article is to educate people on the happenings of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

**Value:** The value of this article, to me, is providing a good amount of historically accurate knowledge on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Also, this article discussed a lot of insight to the thinking of Kennedy and the White House, as well as the Kremlin. Something that interested me in this article was a quote from, the US ambassador to the United Nations at the time, Adlai E. Stevenson, who said to his Soviet counterpart, “he would ‘wait until hell freezes over’ for a Soviet explanation.” (Coleman).


 * Limitations:** A limitation of this source may be, that it is a Dictionary of American History, so there probably is some bias toward the Americans.


 * Kennedy, Robert F. //Thirteen Days//. N.p.: W. W. Norton, 1969. Print.**


 * Origin:** Robert Kennedy wrote this book as a memoir of the events of the missile crisis. He was the US Attorney General at the time, and the brother of the President. He attended all of the famed “Ex Comm” meetings.


 * Purpose:** The purpose of this book was to document a pressing time in history. It talked a lot about the deliberating of the Ex Comm group to make a decision.


 * Value:** This book gives great insight into the thinking of President Kennedy during the crisis. It describes the perspectives of members of the meetings, and how they came to certain decisions to avoid nuclear holocaust. Robert Kennedy constantly talked of the moral and philosophical issues of every choice they made.


 * Limitations:** This book offers insight to the American thinking at the time, but not really the Soviet. Although, President Kennedy was considering throughout possible reactions by the Soviet Union, their actual thought process was not given. Would like to read a similar book, written by a figure in the Soviet Union.