Mackenzie+Martin

Mackenzie Martin Why did the Paris Massacre of 1961 slip from the minds of the people until the trial of Papon in 1998? This investigation will examine the political and social conditions in France from 1960-2000. Further this investigation will examine the role of the Maurice Papon[i] in the massacre, and the cover-up following the massacre. Finally this investigation will look at the censorship following the massacre, and what conditions led to the revival of memory regarding the massacre.
 * 1) Plan of Investigation

Background: Papon: Social/Political Conditions: Censorship: Papon’s Trial:
 * 1) Summary of Evidence
 * The Paris Massacre of 1961 occurred on October 17
 * The FLN[ii] led a protest against a curfew restricting Algerian-Muslims from circulating freely between 8:30p.m and 5:30a.m.[iii]
 * The protest was met with brutal police resistance. The police shot, beat, and killed the unarmed protestors. Protestors that were not killed were loaded onto buses and taken to stadiums, and other holding facilities.[iv]
 * There the protestors were kept in squalid conditions before either being deported to Algeria, or released following peace agreements.[v]
 * Papon led the strikes against the people, issuing orders from a command post.[vi]
 * The number of dead is highly disputed and ranges from between 2 and 300.[vii]
 * Papon began his career and moved up quickly, through the use of repression, and torture.
 * He returned to Paris in 1958 to become prefect of police, where he quickly employed repression over the Algerian-Muslims. [viii]
 * Papon along with others believe in repression and used it often, creating different social conditions for Algerian-Muslims.[ix]
 * Papon assured his officers that they could use violence against protestors.[x]
 * Papon was well prepared to handle the effects of the massacre.[xi]
 * There were different social systems for Algerian-Muslims.[xii]
 * The French didn’t recognize Algerian-Muslims as citizens nor did the Algerian government recognize them in the struggle for independence.[xiii]
 * The Algerian victims from the massacre were not easy to identify with.[xiv]
 * There was no political or social support for the Algerian-Muslims.[xv]
 * When peace talks resumed the massacre was swept under the rug.[xvi]
 * The government covered up the massacre by seizing film and closing off protest sites.[xvii]
 * The government stuck with Papon’s story of two dead.[xviii]
 * Papon used propaganda to whiten his image.[xix]
 * Extra deaths besides the two were blamed on FLN and MNA fighting.[xx]
 * Papon’s trial began with him facing crimes against humanity charges, for deporting Jews.
 * Papon accused Jean-Luc Einaudi of libel for saying is was a massacre.[xxi]
 * The judge ruled in favor of Einaudi for stating the truth about a tragic event.[xxii]
 * The judge’s ruling led to the archives being opened on the events of 17 October.[xxiii]

Annotated Source #1 Cole, Joshua. “Remembering the Battle of Paris: 17 October 1961 in French and Algerian Memory.” French Politics, Culture, and Society 21.3 (2003): 21-50. The author is Joshua Cole, an Associate Professor of History at the University of Michigan. The purpose of this article is to explain what happened during the massacres in Paris, and how it is and isn’t remembered. This source addresses the differences in memory and how the massacre was forgotten, which is closely related to my topic. This article doesn’t address the events immediately after the massacre.
 * 1) Evaluation of Sources

Annotated Source #2 House, Jim, and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory. New York: Oxford Press, 2006. Print. Neil MacMaster is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Political, Social and International Studies. Jim House is Senior Lecturer in French at the University of Leeds. This book goes in-depth about all the pieces regarding the massacre and addresses the censorship as well, which is necessary to my topic. Also this book address Papon’s pre-Prefect positions, which adds another layer to my investigation. This book focuses mostly on Papon’s role and doesn’t explore other causes.

Maurice Papon’s career started in Algeria, and Morocco, where he was involved in refining the repressive techniques that were used to repress the people and assert French control over them. He later used these same techniques in Paris against the Algerian people.[xxiv] When Papon was moved to Paris he saw a capital that was in need of order, and that needed a major overhaul of police procedure especially in regard to the FLN.[xxv] In 1959, the year following his appointment, Papon began importing military officers with experience in Algeria to Paris to head up a new police office for infiltrating the North American population in the capital.[xxvi] Papon saw no difference between using repressive techniques against the FLN, and Algerian-Muslims in Paris, and against people in the French colonies.[xxvii] The implementation of these practices, were made easier with other police that believed the same thing. Papon’s beliefs were not just his own, they were representative of an entire generation of political leaders who believed in repression rather than political negotiation; it was the belief during this time in most western countries that higher values could only be saved, by recourse to exceptional forms of counter-violence.[xxviii] This was the basis for Papon’s and the police’s policy. With a strong basis, Papon needed little reason to engage in the massacre; however, in the five-week period prior to the massacre there were thirteen police deaths at the hands of the FLN.[xxix] The increased death count caused Papon to become frustrated with the lack of progress by the rule of law. Documents from the police archives suggest that during this time the police had prepared to encourage and protect officers who began to use illegal violence.[xxx] All of this together suggests that Papon was not only not afraid to use excessive violence but he was well prepared to do so in a way that did not reflect badly on himself or the police. In the days leading up to the massacre Papon prepared his police by assuring them that whatever extreme measures they undertook, "you will be covered, I give you my word on that. Besides, when you advise headquarters that a North African is down, the officer in charge who will come to the crime scene will have everything necessary to make sure the North African has a weapon on him.”[xxxi] Papon also was not opposed to increasing violence by allowing the officers to believe that there were in fact weapons on the Algerians. By all appearances, Papon did nothing to prevent the relaying of false rumors from one police post to another that policemen had been shot or otherwise killed by the protesters, which most likely contributed to the brutality of the police.[xxxii] The police killings that had taken place in the months before the massacres were what called others to join in but ultimately it was Papon that allowed it to happen and covered it up. In Paris, French Algerian-Muslims had been treated differently for years prior to the massacre. They received different social-care systems, and had officials representing them as a separate group from Parisian citizens.[xxxiii] This meant that the curfew that was imposed on the Algerian-Muslims that might seem racist in retrospect was, had grown from a long tradition of creating different rules for Algerian-Muslims.[xxxiv] The French did not recognize them as citizens, but the Algerian Government would not recognize them as active agents in the struggle for independence either.[xxxv] This meant that when the massacre happened the French citizens did not speak up for the Algerians, and the Algerian government did not speak up for them either. The Algerian victims were not identifiable to the Parisian public, which meant that no political organization would take up the cause because it couldn’t springboard for future change. Instead the massacre was pushed to the side, for events that would be more relatable and would bring political change,[xxxvi] such as the Charonne Massacre.[xxxvii] The lack of support from either country or political parties meant that the Algerian people had no powerful organizations to support them, and the memory of the massacre was only maintained in the minds of the direct participants. [xxxviii] The FLN who had initially started the protest in the first place also did not stand up for the Algerian-Muslims. During the months before and after the massacre violence had escalated in not only Paris but also in Algeria, which seemed counter-intuitive as the GPRA[xxxix] and France were reaching the final rounds of peace negotiations. However both governments wanted to negotiate from a position of strength, which would allow for better terms for their respective countries.[xl] This meant that when they finally did reach a peace agreement it was easier for both French and FLN leaders to quietly pass over the bloody events of 17 October, as well as others, and sign the treaty without repercussions.[xli] The French government used all the means at its disposal in order to cover-up the extent of the repression.[xlii] The cover-up of the massacre took many forms, censorship, the assertion that the deaths that had occurred were due to in fighting between the FLN and the MNA, the official story of two dead, and staged events. The censorship began immediately, journalists, and photographers who approached the scenes of action were physically threatened and their rolls of film were seized.[xliii] The censorship caused journalists and photographers to look deeper into what had actually happened. They didn’t find much, and the police and government continuously held fast to the statement that only two Algerians had been killed and that a dozen of police officers had been hospitalized.[xliv] The media without any clear picture of repression printed the official story. Knowing that he was in trouble, as the media wasn’t likely to leave the official story for long, Papon staged events where he would allow photographers and journalists to take pictures of kindly policemen helping the women that were being ‘forced’[xlv] to protest, and showing the food that was being given to the protesters that were being deported.[xlvi] When questioned about the events by the government Papon ignored the questions and asserted that the Paris police had done what they needed to do.[xlvii] In regards to the fighting between the FLN and the MNA, by this point in 1961 the FLN had mostly won this struggle, and the MNA was in no position to be launching any attacks upon the FLN.[xlviii] This excuse had been used by Papon in the months previous in order to explain the regular number of bodies found in the Seine every month, and the public, not well informed about the fighting between the two Algerian groups, didn’t know that the fighting had mostly ended.[xlix] The trial of Papon began by looking into his crimes against humanity during WWII, but quickly morphed into looking also at the events from the 17 October 1961. Prosecutors called Einaudi to testify, and what he revealed shocked the public.[l] Einaudi gave a detailed report of what had happened on the night of 17 October. In the report he used the word ‘massacre’ in relation to the events and was subsequently sued by Papon for libel. Einaudi won the case, and because of that and Einaudi’s testimony, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was forced to admit that the ‘official’ version of 17 October could no longer be allowed to stand unchallenged.[li] The trial of Papon allowed for the events to come into the light and begin to be scrutinized while the official version was being challenged.
 * 1) Analysis

The Paris Massacre of 1961 slipped from the minds of the people at the time due to the political and social conditions, Papon’s cover-up, and the agreement between the governments to forget the events had occurred. Without any political or social allies, French citizens were willing to readily forget about the Algerian-Muslims and the events that had transpired. Papon was well respected and the government at the time was in a stage where repression was preferable to any potential threats to the political system. Finally the peace agreements ended the war soon after the massacre, causing that to be the focus instead. When Papon was tried he no longer had the affections of the people and Einaudi was able to come in and explain atrocities that most people had never heard of and were willing to learn more about, which caused the reopening of the archives, and the revival of the topic.
 * 1) Conclusion


 * 1) Sources/Word Limit

Sources Bernard, Philippe. “The Magistrates’ Court of Paris Acknowledges the ‘Extreme Violence’ of the Police Crackdown of 17 October 1961.” The Papon Affair. Ed. Richard J. Golsan. New York: Routledge, 2000. 240-242. Print. Cole, Joshua. “Massacres and their Historians: Recent Histories of State Violence in France and Algeria in the 20th Century.” French Politics, Culture, & Society 28.1 (2010): 106-126. - - -. “Remembering the Battle of Paris: 17 October 1961 in French and Algerian Memory.” French Politics, Culture, and Society 21.3 (2003): 21-50. Golsan, Richard J, Vichy's Afterlife: History and Counterhistory in Postwar France (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000) 156-180, Questia, Web, 29 May 2012. House, Jim, and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory. New York: Oxford Press, 2006. Print.

Word Count: 1985

[i] Maurice Papon was the Prefect of Police in Paris from 1958 to 1965. [ii] National Liberation Front [iii]- - -“Remembering the Battle of Paris: 17 October 1961 in French and Algerian Memory.” French Politics, Culture, and Society 21.3 (2003): 24 [iv] Remembering the Battle of Paris 21 [v]House, Jim, and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory. New York: Oxford Press, 2006. Print. 116 [vi]Golsan, Richard J, Vichy's Afterlife: History and Counterhistory in Postwar France (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000) Questia, Web, 29 May 2012. 171 [vii] House 167 [viii] ibid 33 [ix]Remembering 38 [x]Golsan 169 [xi]Remembering 135 [xii] ibid 58 [xiii] ibid 36 [xiv] House 249 [xv]Cole, Joshua. “Massacres and their Historians: Recent Histories of State Violence in France and Algeria in the 20th Century.” French Politics, Culture, & Society 28.1 (2010): 107 [xvi] House 141 [xvii] ibid 135 [xviii] Ibid137 [xix]Vichy 173 [xx]Remembering 25 [xxi]Bernard, Philippe. “The Magistrates’ Court of Paris Acknowledges the ‘Extreme Violence’ of the Police Crackdown of 17 October 1961.” The Papon Affair. Ed. Richard J. Golsan. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print. 240 [xxii] ibid 240 [xxiii]Remembering 27 [xxiv] ibid 60 [xxv] Ibid 61 [xxvi] ibid 39 [xxvii]Golsan 166 [xxviii] House 26 [xxix] House 89 [xxx]Cole 118 [xxxi]Golsan 169 [xxxii] ibid 171 [xxxiii]Remembering 38 [xxxiv] ibid 38 [xxxv] ibid 36 [xxxvi] House 249 [xxxvii] The Charonne massacre took place on February 8, 1962, and caused major outrage as the brutal police violence was brought out into the light. This massacre was widely publicized and received media attention unlike the 17 October massacre. [xxxviii]Cole 107 [xxxix] Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic [xl] House 141 [xli] ibid 143 [xlii] Remembering 25 [xliii] House 137 [xliv] ibid 137 [xlv] Papon maintained until the end that most of the protestors were being forced by the FLN to demonstrate. [xlvi] ibid 138 [xlvii]Golsan 173 [xlviii] Remembering 25 [xlix] ibid 26 [l] ibid 27 [li] ibid 27