To+what+extent+did+collective+security+become+a+victim+of+economic+problems+in+the+inter-war+years?

When Idealism Clashes with Financial Reality President Woodrow Wilson said, in regards to the settlement of WWI, in a 1917 address to the U.S. Senate, “The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace” (1). The concept of “a community of power” or collective security, and thus the creation of the League of Nations proved to be an idealistic solution to maintaining peace around the world following WWI. Created in 1919, the League quickly experienced a period of success by “settling the Swedish-Finnish dispute over the Aaland Islands in 1920-1921, guaranteeing the security of Albania in 1921, rescuing Austria from economic disaster, settling the division of Upper Silesia in 1922, and preventing the outbreak of war between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925" (2). Although successful and significant, these resolutions to international conflicts were relatively small, requiring few resources and little direct involvement by the member nations. It was not until the Manchurian and Abyssinian Crises in 1931-1935 that the League was truly tested, showing that ultimately it lacked both the strength and the will to handle aggressive world powers" (3). President Wilson’s idealistic dream of collective security fell victim to, and ultimately failed, because of the economic problems, that plagued the world throughout the inter-war years. Countries were faced with economic problems because of the failures of the Treaty of Versailles, the mounting war debt, and The Great Depression. The Treaty of Versailles from which the league and its idea of collective security came, may have worked in an ideal society. However, at the time society was far from ideal. The treaty failed to complete any of its goals: rebuild war-torn Europe, create a strong system of collective security, and put reasonable fault on Germany while allowing Germany to rebuild itself at the same time" (4). It put unreasonable fault on Germany, giving Germany little chance to rebuild itself and succeed as a democratic state. The Treaty of Versailles put the reconstruction of post-war Europe on the shoulders of Germany and Germany’s ability to pay reparations payments. Finally the treaty created the League of Nations under the impression it would put an end to international conflicts altogether. Due to the Treaty’s inefficient post-war economic reconstruction policy, European states became overly dependent upon international loans, from the United States in particular" (5). When the American economy crashed the economies of other European states soon followed. These post-war economic problems added to one of the already-pressing issues of national security: the availability of funds and resources. The failures of the Treaty of Versailles only served to further compromise the dim future of collective security throughout the interwar years by adding to the economic struggles of countries all over the world. The concept of collective security is dependent upon the principle that states will cooperate collectively to check global conflicts, in essence creating a secure and inexhaustible world peace" (6). Although this theory may appear logical and even rational, it was in fact inherently flawed by two significant concepts. The first and probably most important was the fear that states involved in the League of Nations would cheat, not abide by its tenets, because there was limited enforcement of the League’s policies" (7). Secondly, states became unwilling to take an active role if they knew other states stood to gain more from their action" (8). This concept of relative gains concessions further explains why some states chose not to join collective security cooperatives altogether. Ultimately, the flaws behind collective security reduced its effectiveness. But when these flaws were combined with the larger issue of a global economic depression, when states were perhaps more conscientious of the use of the limited resources they had available, the League of Nations was destined to fail. At the time, WWI was far and away the largest, costliest, and deadliest war ever" (9). So, although there may have been inspiration to develop a system of collective security to prevent future international conflicts, the prevailing fact was that countries all over the world did not have the resources or funds to put towards the creation of a successful system of collective security. “The United Kingdom and France were exhausted and had limited ability to enforce the decisions of Versailles or the League" (10). Then, when the effects of WWI were coupled with the global economic depression of the 1930s, the democratic states of the League of Nations became even less willing to invest in collective security; the United Kingdom and France retreated even further from international relations and their position in the League. This absence of a major active power in the League of Nations severely limited its effectiveness. The economic crises of the inter-war years further weakened Europe’s halfhearted attempt at collective security. In an ideal society, collective security may be the answer to ending war around the globe. However, in practice, the concept had many flaws. Foremost of these flaws was the willingness of the individual nations to become involved. If they worked collectively to come to mutual gains then the policy was bound to succeed; however, “countries would have to answer the call regardless of their interest in the crisis or its outcome. Money and manpower would have to be sacrificed in defence of a principle and not of vital interests as had been the case in the past… This concept of collective security was too abstract and idealistic for countries raised in tradition of self-interest and traditional diplomacy" (11). Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic dream of collective security fell victim to, and ultimately failed, because of the real economic problems that plagued the world throughout the inter-war years. If individual nations were unable to provide for themselves, how could they help provide for others?

1. “ ’ W e need a peace without v ictory’ W oodrow W ilson’s S enate address, 1 9 1 7. ” // Gu ////ar//// d ////ian////. ////co//// .uk //. T he G uardian, 1 4 N o v. 2008 . W eb. 9 D ec. 2009 . 2. “S uccesses and Failures. ” //In//// f ////o//// p ////lease//. 6 th ed. he Columbia E lectronic E ncyclopedia, 2007. W eb. 9 D ec. 2009 . < http: //www.infoplease.com /‌ ce 6/‌ history /‌A08592 1 7 .html %3E. > . Infoplease is an online encyclopedia sponsored by the Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia and Pearson Education. 3. “P eacemaking, peacekeeping - international relations , 1 9 1 8-36. ” // 20 th C ent u r y W orl d H istor y: C o u rse C o mp anion//. O xford: O xford U. , 2009 . 68-73 . P rint. 4. W olfson, R obert , and John L a v er. “I nternational R elations and Crises 1 9 1 9-39. ” // Y ears o f C hange Eu ro p ean H istor y 1890-1990 //. N .p.: H odder M urray, n.d. 280-281. P rint. 5. M itchener, K ris James. “G reat D epression. ” // W orl d B oo k A dv ance d //. W orld Book, 2009. W eb. 9 D ec. 2009 . < http: //www.worldbookonline.com /‌ ad v anced /‌ article ? id = ar 234080& st = great + depression > 6. M earsheimer, John J. “T he False P romise of I nternational I nstitutions. ” // E ////ssential// // R ////ea//// d ////ings in// // W ////orl//// d // // P ////olitics//. E d. K aren M ingst and Jack S nyder. N .p.: n.p., n.d. 346. P rint. 7. Ibid, 349. 8. Ibid, 349. 9. “E urope A fter W orld W ar I : N o v ember 1 9 1 8-A ugust 1 93 1. ” // H ////o//// w // // S ////t//// uff // // W ////or//// k ////s//. N .p., 2009. W eb. 9 D ec. 2009 . < http: //history.howstuffworks.com /‌ world - war - i /‌ europe - after - world - war - 1.htm >. 10.// 20 th C ent u r y W orl d H istor y: C o u rse C o mp anion//, 53. 11. Ibid, 52.