Griebner,+Jordan

Jordan Griebner Historical Investigation ** Part A: Plan of Investigation ** (102) The purpose of this investigation is to answer the following question: To what extent did the lack of information revealed by the about the My Lai Massacre fuel anti-war sentiment in America? The body of the investigation will examine the disclosure of information by the Army, the event’s impact on the antiwar movement and other critical moments during the movement. Two sources that are utilized in this investigation will be evaluated based on their origins, purposes, values, and limitations. A conclusion will be reached regarding the role of the My Lai Massacre in intensifying the American antiwar movement during the Vietnam War. ** Part B: Summary of Evidence ** (1024) Background: On March 16, 1968, 347 innocent Vietnamese Civilians were murdered during the event known as the My Lai Massacre. Although they did not encounter resistance, members of the Charlie Company ruthlessly murdered women, children and men, raped innocent women and young girls, burned homes, destroyed livestock and food, and fouled the area’s drinking supplies (Hersh 4). However “none of this was officially told by the company to its task force headquarters” (4). Instead, the GIs and lieutenants involved in the massacre did not release any information regarding the massacre except that it was a significant victory in which many Vietcong were killed (Peers 122). Subsequent inquiries and articles were published nearly a year after the massacre that uncovered the entire scope of the atrocity, which sparked mixed feelings within the American public. Disclosure of Information: The men involved in the massacre immediately began to cover-up and deny the atrocities committed at My Lai. Shortly after the incident, reports claimed that “20 Viet Cong had been killed by artillery and heavy crossfire between American and Viet Cong units during the battle” (Hersh 7). Reports to the task force were delayed as none of the men involved were “proud of the body count” (118). At the end of the day Lieutenant Colonel Barker received a report noting 128 enemy and 24 civilian deaths, but was unaware of the manner in which the civilians had been killed. Some witnesses expressed exactly what happened in My Lai, but these reports and subsequent in-house investigations led nowhere, and served as de facto cover-ups (Gray). Significant actions were made, and omitted, to prevent the information from spreading up the chain of command. In fact, no word reached top commanders until “the story broke more than a year later, reflecting a cover-up process within middle ranks” (Gray). In the months following the massacre, further information was not reported in an effort to cover-up the incident. Many documents “indicate that military officials have deliberately withheld from the public important, but embarrassing, factual information about My Lai 4 (Hersh 52). Many times serious crimes such as rape, murder, and arson were treated a violations of rules rather than serious crimes and were rarely reported. Thus members of the Charlie Company did not feel required to share information regarding the incident (145). Even the existing reports were destroyed as “all but two of the reports and documents dealing with My Lai 4 and its aftermath had vanished by the end of 1969” (129). Given the difficulty of bringing My Lai to public attention, it is plausible that other equivalent atrocities occurred that remain undocumented (Gray). While an official investigation was conducted, no significant facts about the investigation were made public. Instead the army released inaccurate and misleading statements regarding the number of murders (Sim). Army officials told newsmen that “none of [the investigation] material could be released to the public, to avoid damaging pre-trial publicity” and that “upon release, the materials would have to be carefully censored to ensure that no material damaging to America’s foreign policies or national security was made available (Hersh 128). In an effort to protect its reputation, the army steadfastly refused to reveal how many civilians were, in fact, killed by Charlie Company on March 16. During the investigation and trial, the Army pressured William Peers to use the word “incident” rather than “massacre” to mask the seriousness of the event (Sim). In addition, the military pushed for individual prosecutions, which minimized damage to the Army's reputation. Impact on antiwar sentiment: The war crimes, such as the My Lai Massacre represent an important, yet virtually unknown, chapter in the history of the Vietnam antiwar movement. It raised intensely troubling questions concerning the legality and morality of the American effort in Vietnam. Events such as this “raised dark questions about the personal responsibility of US Policymakers for the consequences of their policies in Vietnam, as well as doubts about their fundamental motives for prosecuting the war” (Small 35). When facts about My Lai finally emerged, it created a “world-wide outcry” because the message of the incident came through loud and clear to many Americans—not only did their commitment of sons and tax dollars to Vietnam appear questionable, but also the very morality of the mission (Bates 67). Americans began to examine war crimes more closely through antiwar groups and conferences. In early 1971, the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) held the Winter Soldier Investigation in which more than one hundred Vietnam veterans testified to having witness or participated in a wide range of atrocities. These hearings revealed that war crimes had become a standard procedure in Vietnam and “My Lai was no unusual occurrence, other than, perhaps, the number of victims killed all in one place, all at one time, all by one platoon” (42). While the press did cover the hearings, coverage was superficial or nonexistent in many parts of the country. The public expressed ambivalent reactions to veterans’ allegations about My Lai. On the one hand, there seemed to be general acceptance of the veterans’ veracity. On the other hand, many, if not most, Americans were reluctant to believe that brutal atrocities could be part of the routine in Vietnam (46). These hearings also served as a necessary transition for Veterans to become public witnesses against their government’s policies in Vietnam. Yet many viewed the larger antiwar movement as an “alien force or with suspicion, resentment, and hostility” (47). The incident at My Lai did not spark major protests because although “many Americans suspected that serious mistakes had been made…few questioned the righteousness of the cause, the very foundation of the government’s policy” (49). The public more easily recognized atrocities as crimes, and the veterans’ war crimes hearings helped the antiwar movement show the criminal nature of the Vietnam War, and to shift legitimacy from the US Government to the antiwar forces. In this case the chance of provoking outrage was greatly reduced by the very conception of war, namely a struggle between armed opponents; because the opponent is using violence, using violence against the opponent seems far more justifiable than it might otherwise (Gray). ** Part C: Evaluation of Sources ** (288) Small, Melvin. // Give Peace a Chance //. Ed. Melvin Small and William D Hoover. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992. Print. The origin of this book is from Wayne State University, where Melvin Small is a professor of history. He has concentrated his research on the postwar era, with an emphasis on the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement. The purpose of the book is to provide information about various instances in the Vietnam War that contributed to the anti-war movement. The value of the book is that it details the public’s response to the My Lai Massacre, the topic of this investigation. Small discusses the effect of the war crimes in My Lai on American public opinion. A limitation of the book is that because the book covers multiple events during the Vietnam War, the amount of detail included about My Lai is limited. Hersh, Seymour. // Cover Up //. New York: Random House, 1972. Print. The Origin of this book is from Seymour Hersh, an investigative journalist and regular contributor to // The New Yorker //. The purpose of the book was to expose the truth behind the massacre. After receiving a tip from Geoffrey Cowan about a Lieutenant being Court-Martialed for killing civilians in Vietnam, Hersh decided to investigate the situation. His research resulted in writing this book, which gained world-wide recognition for exposing the truth behind the massacre. The value of the book is that Hersh uncovers the full story of how those involved kept the massacre secret. The book explains how and why the massacre took place, who planned it, and what happened during the subsequent investigations. Hersh goes into depth about how the Army covered-up the incident, which is a vital part to this investigation. The limitation is that while Hersh did extensive research on the massacre and the following interrogations, he did not participate in either event and therefore does not have a first hand account. ** Part D: Analysis ** (433) In some cases, the My Lai Massacre did fuel antiwar sentiments in America, however, this was not always the case. There were conflicting views among the American public. Some Americans supported the soldiers and protested the trials while some Americans rejected the actions in My Lai. Although the cover-up of the massacre did intensify some anti-war protests, the protests were not intensified solely because of the cover-up. A portion of the American public denounced the occurrences at My Lai arguing that the murders were ruthless and hateful. For some My Lai became a “symbol of an unjust war” (Gray). Those that opposed the massacre took action to foster awareness and concern about the incident. They led protests of the war and tried to sway the government to end the war in Vietnam. The massacre “backfired on the U.S. military and government” as it discredited the war in the eyes of many U.S. civilians and troops, and many members of the public in other countries (Gray). In contrast, some viewed the massacre as a forgivable, necessary part of war. To some it was simply an unfortunate episode, with the soldiers warranting congratulations for pursuing the enemy (Gray). Racism and stereotyping played a major role in reducing the public’s concern about the incident. As long as the enemy was killed, the method of killing did not matter (Sim). Many explained or justified the actions by accepting the event as an inevitable part of war and by blaming the Vietnamese. Some soldiers made the excuse that they were only following orders or fulfilling their duty—an excuse that was widely accepted in America (Gray). In addition, many accepted that the event was **“**unrepresentative of the manner in which the forces conduct military operations in Vietnam” (Hersh 132). When Calley was convicted, public opinion leaned toward Calley’s defense, arguing that he was being scapegoated and unfairly punished. While the cover-up by the Army did play a major role in defining the massacre, it was not the sole reason for discontent among Americans. Protestors were not only angry with the lack of information about the massacre, but also with the massacre itself and the way in which the civilians were killed. The Army did not alert the public about the seriousness of the incident, but ultimately Americans were upset with the Army for actually participating in the massacre rather than lying about the massacre. In addition, there is an arbitrary line between covering up and reinterpreting an event. Some viewed the reports about My Lai as reinterpretations rather the cover-ups, thus taking blame away from the Army (Gray). ** Part E: Conclusion ** (79) The My Lai massacre did encourage some anti-war protests, it was not a pivotal event during the anti Vietnam War movement because some Americans were not concerned about the event. Public opinion was not overwhelmingly against the massacre. Instead, many Americans continued to support the War and forgave the atrocities committed at M Lai. In addition, the protests that did occur were not a result of just the Army’s cover-up of the event, but of the actual event itself. ** Part F: Sources and word limit ** Word Count: 1,926 Bates, Milton, et al., comps. // Reporting Vietnam //. 2nd ed. New York: Library of America, 1998. Print. Gray, Truda, and Brian Martin. “My Lai: The Struggle Over Outrage.” // Peace and Change // Jan. 2008: 90-113. Web. 8 Nov. 2010. . Hersh, Seymour. // Cover Up //. New York: Random House, 1972. Print. Peers, William. // The My Lai Inquiry //. New York: Norton & Company, 1979. Print. Sim, Kevin, and Michael Bilton. // Remember My Lai //. 1989. PBS: Frontline. Videocassette. Small, Melvin. // Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement //. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994. Print. - - -. // Give Peace a Chance //. Ed. Melvin Small and William D Hoover. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992. Print.