French+Role+in+the+Suez+Crisis

Contents 1) Intra-state Level A) Political B) Economic 2) International Level A) Strain with Egypt B) French Sympathy for Israel 3) Outcomes of the Crisis for France

1) Intra-state Level of analysis on France

France was dealing with "a volatile situation in North Africa," in the colonies of Morocco, tunisia, and Algeria. "Nasser actively supported the Algerian rebels..." (BK 123), who were staging a bloody revolt against the French rule in the region. Nasser was able to incite more violence in the region through his Radio Cairo broadcasts, in which he utilized Mr. Hate and the power he was gaining through his listening base in social and cultural terms, and he also funneled arms to the Algerian rebels for military and political power. This agitated France, as they knew that Nasser was one of the ways the Algerian rebels were gaining widespread support, as well as armaments, and gave them valid reason for wanting his removal from power.

When Nasser was able to take the Suez Canal from Britain, France was also affected, as they had a company operating the Suez Canal due to an agreement with Britain. The revenue from this was not as significant as the British economic losses, but the losses were still not welcome in the French government, as they were struggling to deal funding their military, which was occupied with rebellions across their empire.

2) The International Level of Analysis of France's involvement.

Egypt and France seemed to be even more at odds than Britain and Egypt, as France controlled more territories at the time of Nasser's ascension to power. This made France the perfect target for Nasser's anti-colonial policies, whereas Britain only needed to be given the final shove out of the Middle East in Nasser's mind. The Radio Cairo broadcasts vocalized this international tension as well, and Nasser's open support for Algerian rebels were seen as perfect reason to support Nasser's overthrow. France "steadfastly refused to accept the idea of an international authority [running] the canal," (BK 126) and even more staunchly opposed the idea that the Egyptians would run it. This was the only way the two countries had direct and hostile interaction, which made the Suez Canal the perfect battleground between the two countries. Not only was Egypt's active workings against French colonialism straining their relations, but also France's aid to Israel.

"There was...sympathy for Israel in France..." since "French and Israeli socialists shared common ideals, and many Jews had fought in the French Resistance," (BK 123). This led the international ties between the two to become very close, and "support for Israel existed in both the military and political establishments," (BK 123). France was the first Western power to supply armaments to Israel, beginning in 1954, which again angered Egypt. It was this sympathy that led to Guy Mollet's, France's Prime Minister, invitation to "Israel to participate" in the plan to take military action in regards to the canal, and "six days later, an initial meeting took place between Israeli and French military representatives, while Shimon Peres...had talks in Paris," (BK 126). This was not the end of Franco-Israeli collusion, as it blossomed into the joint talks with both the British and French missions on October 21, 1956. Out of this collusion, was the plan for Israel to launch an offensive against the Egyptians to set the Crisis into play, which was made possible by France's "approved...sale of twelve Ouragan jet fighters to Israel in Decemeber 1954," (BK 124). This deal was expanded upon in 1955, when Egypt secured arms from the Soviet Union, to include "fourteen additional Ouragan fighters and twelve Mystere-4 jet fighter-bombers to be sent to Israel," (BK 124). French and Israeli relations were secured from then on out, which further increased tension between Egypt and France.

3) France's Outcome after the Suez Crisis

"Britain and France were completely discredited by the war, and their prestige and influence plummeted throughout the Arab world. In some respects this situation tended to thrust the United States even more definitively into the role" of a superpower, (BK 127). However, France's influence in the region was not entirely hampered. Short term loses included less international standing (which made their Algerian rebellion problem even worse) as well as a lack of income from their Suez Canal company. Long term outcomes were both positive and negative, as the French ruined their future diplomatic relations with Arab countries for the future, but on the other hand secured their influence in the region through Israel, which, until 1967, was dependent on the "French [as] the major suppliers of Israel's military needs," (BK 124).