Stock,+James

A. Plan of Investigation

France and Israel have had outstanding relations since the nation of Israel was formed in 1947. Mutual interests in the 1950’s bred cooperation that allowed for exchanges between the two countries, including the building of Israel’s first nuclear reactor at Dimona. The purpose of this investigation is to determine to what extent this cooperation aided Israel’s attempts at acquiring nuclear weapons.
 * How did** **France****’s cooperation with** **Israel** **in the 1950’s and 1960’s lead to** **Israel****’s emergence as a nuclear arms nation?**

B. Summary of Evidence France and Israel began their cooperation when the nation of Israel was formed, soon after the Second World War. In 1945 David Ben-Gurian, the leader of the Jews in Palestine, met with many ex-insurgents in Paris who had fought the Germans during the occupation. This group helped him in [setting] up a sophisticated operational headquarters in Paris” [1]. This operational headquarters allowed for extensive diplomatic exchange during the next 20 years.

In 1955, America agreed to supply a small research reactor to Israel, but demanded to be able to regulate it and prevent weapons manufacturing. Previously, an arms embargo had been placed by the United States, England, and France, on the Middle East following the second world war. For this reason, France refused to open up arms negotiation to a Middle Eastern nation and the Israeli headquarters in Paris could not reach an agreement with French ambassadors. In 1955, as the Algerian conflict was gaining steam, the French government began to open itself to arms negotiation. France believed that Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was funding the insurgency in French colonial Algeria. “Israel needed arms and France needed intelligence about Nasser’s role in instigating and promoting the Algerian rebellion” [2]. The Suez crisis accelerated the process of nuclear exchange, as Egypt applied more pressure to France and Israel. France demanded a pretext to go to war for the Suez, and if that condition was met, France would supply a large reactor similar to one it had built in Saclay, near Paris. [3] .On September 27th 1956, Egypt signed a large arms treaty with Czechoslovakia, provoking Israel to put more pressure on the French government for an arms deal and reactor. A vital source of heavy water was secured in April of 1956, the United States. The U.S. atomic energy agency decided to disallow acquisition of American uranium, but gave the Israeli government the go-ahead to purchase heavy water in the U.S, so long as it was used for “civilian purposes”. Since Israel had provided the pretext for the French-English offensive for the Suez canal, France honored its previous agreement and supplied Israel with a research and future production reactor in 1957, at a site in the Negev desert called Dimona. In addition to the reactor, France provided hundreds of tons of natural uranium for the startup and maintenance of the reactor, in addition to a plutonium processing factory. This would prove to be the main source of research for Israel’s early nuclear weapons. The actual agreement for the reactor stated that “Israel undertook to use the installations only for civilian purposes, but both sides knew this was a fiction” [4]. During the building of the site at Dimona, France transported heavy water from Norway. The Suez offensive failed miserably, and as France pulled out, much of the cooperation with Israel diminished with it. The Algerian revolution began to intensify as Nasser poured weapons and money into the insurgent forces. In the early 1960’s, French concern grew, and France began to pressure Israel to comply with international regulations. France also expressed its desire that Israel disclose the nature of its plant in the Negev in order to avoid an international scandal that would inevitably expose the French efforts to arm Israel. France’s war with Algeria was winding to a close in the early 1960’s, and with that in mind, it began to distance itself from Israel. This happened after the building of Dimona, and by this point, France was powerless to stop Israel from researching its own nuclear technologies. French aid for the research (in the form of yellow cake and heavy water) ended in the 1960's, even as Israel continued research at Dimona. The main challenge now came from resource problems in the latter portion of the 1960's. In order to secure more Uranium, Israel organized an infamous operation by the Mossad to buy yellow cake through a front company in West Germany. This event, dubbed the Plumbat Affair, supplied Israel with over 200 tons of yellow cake and solved the supply issue. In 1967, the Six Day War occurred during a period of intense turmoil in the Middle East. By this point, Israel was believed to be armed with two nuclear warheads, both of which were put on high alert in case the attacking Arab countries would approach Jerusalem or other urban centers. During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, several nuclear warheads were mobilized again due to the approaching armies, but the armies were repulsed before the weapons were used. Israel has continued its weapons production, and has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or acknowledged the existence of its nuclear weapons program.

C. Evaluation of Sources

**Foster, Charles A. “****ISRAEL** **AND** **MORDECHAI VANUNU.” Rev. of //The Woman from Mossad: The Torment of Mordechai Vanunu//, by Peter Hounam. //Contemporary Review// (June 2000): 323. //Opposing//** **//Viewpoints//** **//Resource//** **//Center//****. Web.** **30 Sept. 2010****. .** This origin of this source is the contemporary review, to which Charles Foster, a former researcher in Jerusalem, is a contributor. This review discusses Mordechai Vanunu, an ex-nuclear scientist for Israel who told the world about the Israeli weapons program after he left the country. The purpose of this source is to assess the validity of the author’s assessment of the Israeli response, but also to attack Vanunu for his role in exposing the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The value of this source is that it shows an Israeli or allied view of Vanunu’s defection, and also assesses the credibility of his testimony from a fairly unbiased view. The limitations of this source come from its lack of scope—this is merely a review of a book, and not a very broad commentary on Vanunu’s credibility. This source also has a slight pro-Israeli bias.

**Vanunu, Mordechai. “Israeli Nuclear Whistleblower Risks Arrest, Again.” Interview by Amy Goodman. //CounterPunch//** **18 Aug. 2004****: n. pag. Web.** **16 Sept. 2010****. .** The origin of this source is Counterpunch, an online newsletter that has been accused of being anti-Semitic. The value of this source is that it gives historians an actual interview transcript with Vanunu, a man who implicated many nations (including France) with helping Israel to pursue nuclear armament. The purpose of this interview is to expose Israel’s treatment of Vanunu and to show that Israel is hiding its nuclear program. The limitations of this interview are that it may have a strong anti-Semitic basis, and also it could be altered because of the political opinions of the recorders. This piece is about a controversial subject and the bias of the authors casts suspicion upon the validity of this interview.

[1] Karpin, Michael. //The Bomb in the Basement//. New York: Simon, 2006. Print. [2] Ibid [3] Ibid [4] Ibid